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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Case No. 890121-CA
Plaintiff /Respondent,
vs.
Category No. 10

GREGORY J. MARSHALL,
Defendant/Appellant.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Respondent's Petition for Rehearing does not demonstrate that the Court
failed to consider material facts nor misconstrued or overlooked controlling case
law. The Court correctly ruled that standing may not be raised for the first time
on appeal and there was no consent to the search. Respondent's new request to
consider the reasonableness of the Officer's action is improper.
POINT I

RESPONDENT HAS NOT MET THE LEGAL STANDARDS
NECESSARY FOR REHEARING
Pursuant to Rule 35 of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals, a petition
for rehearing must state with particularity the points of law or fact which the
petitioner claims the Court has overlooked or misapprehended.

Since the

Respondent is seeking rehearing, it is the Respondent's burden to establish that
the Court erred. The Respondent has failed to meet this burden.
Respondent's argument that the Court failed to consider material facts is
stated in the Respondent's Statement of Fact rather than its Argument. (See

Petition for Rehearing pp. 2-5) Additionally, it does not identify any material
facts which the court failed to consider or added improperly.

Instead, the

Respondent makes the argument that neither party took the position that Mr.
Marshall consented to search of the suitcases both in the lower court and on
appeal, therefore, the Defendant waived its challenge to the search and seizure of
the suitcases. That assertion in the Respondent's statement of the fact misstates
the record in the lower court, misstates the legal burden of production and proof
on the issue of consent, and attempts to change the basis for validating the search
that the State has asserted throughout these proceedings.
Warrantless searches and seizures are per se unreasonable unless exigent
circumstances justify them. State v. Cole, 674 P.2d 119 (Utah 1983); State v.
Romero, 660 P.2d 715 (Utah 1983). Once the Defendant has raised the issue of
illegal search and seizure in a warrantless search, the burden is on the State to
prove that the search was legal. State v. Christensen,

676 P.2d 408 at 411 (Utah

1984). Until this matter came up on appeal, the State has persisted in a claim that
the search was legal only because Mr. Marshall consented to the search of the
property at issue in this case. (See e.g. Tl and Record pp. 164-70). As noted by
this Court in its opinion, the State has never argued that any basis other than
consent validated the search of the suitcases in this case nor does the record
support any other basis. State v. Marshall, 124 Ut. Adv. Rpts. 60 at 66 n. 7 (Ut.
Ct. App. Dec. 26, 1989). Since consent is the basis the State is relying upon, "it is
the State's burden to establish that from the totality of the circumstances a valid
consent was properly obtained and freely given.n State v. Iacono, 725 P.2d 1375

2

at 1377 (Utah 1986), citing State v. Wittenback,

621 P.2d 103, 106 (Utah 1980).

Additionally, as noted by the court, the ruling of State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972 at
980 (Ut. Ct. App. 1988), that includes a burden to establish that consent was
voluntary.
The Respondent's argument herein is intended to shift that burden to the
Appellant in contradiction of controlling case law and constitutional standards.
In examining the record to determine whether or not the Respondent has met its
burden, a review of direct examination at the hearing on the Motion to Suppress1
discloses the only evidence the Respondent presented to show consent. As that
record indicates, no consent to search was evidenced or proven. (Tl pp. 4-5).
Appellants have specifically and continually argued that the Respondent did not
meet its burden of proving consent as to the areas and items searched, both in the
Brief of the Appellant and at length in the lower court during argument on this
matter.
Counsel for the Defendant's closing argument at the time of the suppression
hearing on the issue of consent is as follows:
I think it's clear that the Officer had an attitude that he
was gonna search this vehicle, regardless, and that his
drug courier profile and hunch, based on that, was
sufficient for him to go ahead and search this vehicle
without Mr. Marshall's consent. I don't think that his
testimony's established that there was consent to search
the whole vehicle. I think that when Mr. Marshall said,
"You could look around in the car," Mr. Marshall
believed that he was gonna do a plain view cursory search
1

The record also contains the preliminary hearing transcript and a deposition
of the Officer. It is counsel for Appellant's position, upon review of the same, that
the examination contained therein add no more than the testimony on direct
examination at the suppression hearing.
3

of that car. And at some point, because Mr. Marshall is
continuing to be detained, and it was obvious he was
being detained, this turned into directions of: "Would
you open the trunk." I don't believe, therefore, there was
consent to search that trunk. Additionally, there's no
evidence that there is any consent to search those bags.
And Your Honor, there's a recent Supreme Court case,
additionally, that states that closed containers should not
be searched without probable cause and without a search
warrant, even in an inventory search.
Tl pp. 34-35
MR. McPHEE:
THE COURT:
MR. McPHEE:
THE COURT:
MR. McPHEE:
THE COURT:
MR. McPHEE:

He says, "Look in the vehicle."
Now we've got a consent, haven't we?
I don't think so, Judge.
Well, that is the whole issue.
Okay. And I don't think that the case law would show
that there was consent. First of all-Well, he said it. "I consent." Isn't that a consent?
Well, Your Honor, the questions becomes what's legal
consent. "Now, can I look in the vehicle?" That's one
thing. I may understand that to mean one thing. The
Court may understand that to mean one thing, but we're
talking now about an individual who's from New York
City. We now have to deal with a subjective standard.
What did Mr. Marshall give consent to do? What did the
Officer ask for?

"I want to look in the vehicle." "Fine. Look in the vehicle." And then, "Well
let me see in the trunk," or whatever was said. Tl pp. 41-42

For the Respondent to argue that the Defendant waived a challenge to the
search and seizure of the bag misstates the record and is merely an attempt to
excuse the Respondent's failure to meet its burden of proving consent in the lower
court.
The Respondent's Statement of Facts also asserts that the alleged "waiver"
by the Defendant allows the Court to hear the issue of standing. (See Petition for
4

Rehearing at p. 3). Conversely, for the reasons stated hereinbelow, the standing
issue was waived by the State and the record presumes, and establishes, standing.
The Statement of Facts additionally argues that this Court should now
consider the reasonableness of the Officer's actions and allow the State to
bootstrap

a standing

and

abandonment

argument

into

an argument

of

"reasonableness". (Petition for Rehearing at p. 3) The only issue in this case is
consent. There is no issue of "reasonableness".
The balance of the Respondent's Statement of Facts attempts to reargue
what the Respondent has already presented to this Court. Moreover, it persists in
stating that a disclaimer of ownership was raised sua sponte as an issue of consent
by the Court. In doing so, the Respondent attempts to ask this Court to focus on
issues not raised on appeal and to ignore the fact that the State failed to meet its
burden regarding consent in a lower Court. As set forth in its opinion, and from
the extensive record in the lower court, it was established that there was no
consent to search the suitcases. State v. Marshall,

124 Ut. Adv. Rpts. 60, 63-65.

(Ut. Ct. App. 1989).
Finally, Respondent failed to demonstrate in its Petition for Rehearing that
this Court has overlooked controlling case law in the basis for its decision in this
case. State

v. Schlosser,

774 P.2d 1132 (Utah 1989) is the controlling case law.

The Respondent is improperly asking the Court to overturn State

v.

Schlosser}

supra or to make a skewed interpretation thereof. Based thereon, the Respondent
has failed to demonstrate a legal basis for rehearing and the Petition for
Rehearing should be denied.

5

POINT II
STANDING MAY NOT BE RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON
APPEAL AND IS NOT AN ISSUE BEFORE THIS COURT
In their Petition for Rehearing the Respondent urges this Court to consider
several issues that were not raised on appeal and were presumed to have been
established in the lower court.2

(Petition for Rehearing pp. 6-15).

The

Respondent has never argued at any juncture that there was a question of Mr.
Marshall's privacy interest. Consequently, the Respondent has waived the issue
according to the Schlosser

ruling.

In Point I, Respondent contends that this Court applied Schlosser and its
ruling in this case to allow automatic standing. Appellant has never asserted that
automatic standing is the applicable rule of law and this Court's ruling does not
adopt that rule. To support its standing argument, the Respondent is once again
asking this Court to reach the issue of abandonment, relying on an alleged
disclaimer of ownership of the property by the Defendant, another new issue.
Moreover, a review of the record indicates that Respondent failed to argue or
establish abandonment. The cross examination of the Officer at the suppression
hearing establishes that abandonment was not relied upon in this case to validate
the search or defeat standing.
MZ. [sic] SMITH
Q
At that time you placed him under arrest, after searching the clothes
containers; is that correct?
A
Which clothes containers? You mean—
2

The record establishes, and the Respondent concedes that the Defendant had
a privacy interest in the vehicle and trunk and there is no competent or clear
evidence of abandonment which would legally defeat his privacy interest in the
bags contained therein.
6

Q
A
Q
A
Q
A
Q
A

The clothes bags.
In the back? In the back of the trunk?
Yes.
Yes.
Did it ever occur to you at that time to get a search warrant on
opening those bags?
No.
Why did you believe you had the right to do it? Because you felt they
were abandoned property? What?
No. Because I knew exactly what was going to be in them, or a
facsimile. I knew that there was illegal contraband inside the bags.

T i p . 29
Moreover, as noted by this Court in its opinion, the abandonment argument
is supported by the State only with what is described as "somewhat ambiguous
disclaimer" of ownership, State

v. Marshall,

124 Ut. Adv. Rpts. 60 at 65. That

disclaimer is legally insufficient in this jurisdiction to establish abandonment.
In State

v. Holmes,

77'4 P.2d 506 (Utah App. 1989), this court specifically

set forth the standard which must be met by the state when a disclaimer is asserted
to support abandonment and defeat standing. In that case, drug paraphernalia was
discovered in a roll of paper towels that the Defendant attempted to stuff between
a car seat and console in a vehicle. In a footnote the court ruled as follows:
When the arresting officer asked defendant for the roll
of paper towels, she denied it was hers. The state points
out that if defendant's disclaimer of ownership were truly
credible, she would have no legitimate expectation of
privacy in the roll of paper towels and thus no standing
to contest the validity of the search. See, e.g., Rakas
v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 99 S. Ct. 421, 58 L. Ed. 2d 387
(1978); State v. Larocco,
742 P.2d 89 (Utah App.
1987). In making its ruling on the evidence, the trial
court here necessarily determined that standing was not
an issue. We note that a mere disclaimer of ownership
in the context of a police query is insufficient in itself to
make such an assertion. Accord State v. Allen, 93
Wash.2d 170, 606 P.2d 1235, 1236 (1980) (since the
evidence was found on defendant's person and was to be
7

used against him, there was no question that defendant
had standing to contest the search).
Id. at 511, n. 5.
As in Holmes, the trial court in this case, having ruled on the evidence,
necessarily determined that standing was not an issue.3
The Respondent next argues that the Marshall decision imposes a duty on
a prosecutor to object to all possible grounds raised and unraised when confronted
with a motion to suppress. (Petition for Rehearing p. 10). Once again, the
Respondent is claiming that it should not be required to meet its burden under
controlling case law and that the burden should therefore shift to the Defendant
to do the State's job for them. That statement proposes that a Defendant should
address all issues which the State may want to raise to validate the search at any
point in the litigation, despite whose burden it is to present and prove them, or
that Defendant waives his right to contest new issues being raised on appeal.
Next, the Respondent argues that this Court has misconstrued the Schlosser
ruling. (Petition for Rehearing at p. 11) As stated by this Court in its opinion, the
Schlosser

"standing" rule was fashioned to protect the Defendant from being

required to deal with new legal issues on appeal when it had no warning of the
necessity to develop the relevant facts below." State v. Marshall,

supra, at 61.

As further noted, Defendant's counsel may have put the Defendant on the stand

3

An examination of the record and the lower court's ruling in Holmes
evidences that the ruling was even less specific than that in this case and no
standing issue was raised. Therefore it was not an issue and is not an issue in this
case.
8

if they had ever known it was an issue. 4 State

v. Marshall,

supra at 61. It is

precisely for that reason that this Court should not consider that new claim on
appeal but should rather adhere to its rule that new issues cannot be raised by
either party on appeal.

The conferences between co-counsel for Defendant,

evidenced on the record, were specifically for the purpose of determining what
evidence to present given the State's development of the record.
The Respondent next urges the Court to rule that the Appellant cannot raise
new issues on appeal but that the Respondent can.5 It has never been the position
of this Court that one party may raise new issues on appeal while the other cannot.
It certainly would be in violation of equal protection provided for in under the
State and Federal Constitutions to allow this argument. The ruling in State
Schlosser

v.

is both clear and controlling; not subject to the interpretation

attempted by the Respondent. Standing for Fourth Amendment purposes is not
jurisdictional. It is a substantive doctrine and therefore, shall not be raised sua
sponte or on appeal for the first time. That position is supported by the United
States Supreme Court case Steagald

v. United

States,

451 U.S. 204 (1981).

The Respondent also argues that this Court's interpretation of

Schlosser

is inconsistent with prior Utah case law and in conflict with the recent Utah Court
of Appeals decision of State

v. Tebbs, 126 Ut. Adv. Rpts. 16 (Ut. Ct. App. 1990)

4

In fact, the Defendant was present at the suppression hearing having traveled
from New York City to give testimony if necessary. Based on the State's
development of the record and arguments made by the State, a tactical decision
was made not to have him testify.
5

The Respondent has already required the Appellant to file a Reply Brief to
the new issues in their Brief.
9

(Petition for Rehearing at p. 12). The cases cited are distinguishable, do not stand
for the proposition that the Respondent claims, and in part, are not directly
applicable to a standing issue under the Fourth Amendment.
The Respondent is urging an interpretation that "standing" is the same for
all purposes in all types of cases. However, standing is a generic legal term which
does not have the same legal interpretation in all cases. In fact, "standing", as
applied to a Fourth Amendment or Article I Section VII privacy interest is unique
in its type and application.
State

v. Tebbs,

supra, addresses a question of standing to raise an issue

on appeal that has nothing to do with the Fourth Amendment or Article I, Section
VII.

In that case, the Defendant was challenging the constitutionality of the

statute and an element of criminal intent therein. His standing to challenge this
issue only arose when the issue was appealed and did not involve standing in
connection with search and seizure rights. The Court in Tebbs found that he was
not allowed to question the States's burden to prove the criminal intent element
of the crime because he had pled to the charge and therefore waived that burden.
Having done so, his standing to challenge that portion of the statute became an
issue only when the appeal was filed.
The State also relies on State
examination of Tuttle

v. Tuttle,

780 P.2d 1023 (Utah 1989). An

evidences the same distinction. In Tuttle,

there was an

appeal of the Court's failure to death qualify a jury. The Court found that because
the Defendant did not receive the death penalty he did not have standing on
appeal to bring that issue before the Court.

Once again, the question of the

Defendant's standing only became an issue after trial when the appeal was taken.
10

In State v. Constantino,

732 P.2d 125 (Utah 1987) the opinion, the motion

to suppress was made at the beginning of trial and denied. There was apparently
no prior opportunity or necessity for either party to develop the issues in the lower
court. The opinion does not indicate whether or not the Defendant's expectation
of privacy in the property was raised for the first time on appeal. In fact, the
opinion treats it as if it were an issue at all stages of the litigation. The same
appears true in State

v. Valdez,

689 P.2d 1134 (Utah 1984).

Neither case

evidences that the Defendant objected to the raising of standing in the Appellate
court as done here.
In State

v. Valdez,

supra, and State

v. lacono,

725 P.2d 1375 (1986),

both of the Defendants conceded, by affirmative testimony at trial, that they did
not have an expectation of privacy in the area searched. There was no concession
made in this case regarding the same. Apparently having only the trial record to
examine, it appears that the Defendant took an affirmative contradictory position,
regarding standing to defend against his criminal responsibility. Also in
supra,

Iacono,

there was no motion to suppress or objection to the admissibility of the

evidence made in the lower court. Nonetheless, those cases were decided before
State

v. Schlosser,

supra and Schlosser

presently stands as controlling case

law. If there is any perceived conflict in the law, Schlosser

should govern.

The other Utah cases cited by the Respondent are civil cases that do not
address standing in the context of the Fourth Amendment or Article I, Section VII.
They are therefore distinguishable from the type of standing that the Respondent
is attempting to raise before this Court. Society

11

of Professional

Journalists,

Utah Chapter
Board

v. Bullock,

of State

Restaurants

Lands

Assoc,

743 P.2d 1166, 1169, (Utah 1987); Terracor
and Forestry,

v. Utah

716 P.2d 796, 798 (Utah 1986);

v. Davis Co. Board of Health,

Utah

709 P.2d 1159, 1160 (Utah

1985) involve standing of an association in a civil case. None of those cases raised
standing in the context of the constitutional protections raised in this case. A
different type of standing is involved.
Additionally, in civil cases where standing of the Plaintiff is in question it
is Plaintiff's burden in the lower court, to proceed and establish their case. The
burden is different in criminal, search and seizure cases and standing in a search
and seizure context is properly akin to an affirmative defense which must be
raised. 6
The cases cited by the Respondent in its argument that the Court's position
is in conflict with the majority of jurisdictions in the United States are not
dispositive or binding on this Court nor does it demonstrate a majority of
jurisdictions hold that way. (Petition for Rehearing at p. 13) State v.
supra,

Schlosser,

is dispositive and binding on this Court.
The Respondent next attempts to argue that the Court misinterpreted the

ruling in Steagald
Steagald

v. United

v. United

States,

451 U.S. 204 (1981 Slip. op. 4) In fact,

States validates the underlying logic of the decision in this

6

The Respondent appears to be suggesting, contrary to establish procedural
law, that this Court shift the initial burden of proof and production at a
suppression hearing and require the Defendant to proceed. They are further
requesting this Court apply this procedural change to this Defendant ex post
facto.
For the court to provide that the Defendant proceed first would be
impractical and shift time honored burdens of proof that have been engrained as
procedure in the courts of this state since its founding, a procedure which was
properly relied upon by Appellant's counsel.
12

case, that the State should not be allowed to take a contrary position at the time
of appeal on a matter. At the lower court proceedings, standing was asserted and
assumed. The Respondent now attempts to argue, contrarily, that abandonment
can be claimed when the record reflects that the Officer did not rely on
abandonment and any alleged "disclaimer" on the record would not legally
establish abandonment. By virtue of the totality of the evidence on the record,
standing is not an issue.
The above-stated argument does not demonstrate that this Court's ruling was
contrary to controlling case law. It only urges the court to hear an argument that
was not raised and is not supported by the record,
POINT III
THE COURT CORRECTLY LOOKED AT THE
CONSENT AND CORRECTLY DECIDED IT

ISSUE

OF

The Respondent's argument in Point II of its Brief is merely an effort to
once again bring the issue of abandonment before the Court, apparently under a
theory of reasonableness of the search. 7 Reasonableness is not an issue in this
case and never has been. Consent to the search has been and is the only issue.
Additionally, there is no support on the record for that argument, as stated
hereinabove. Respondent is now bringing yet another new argument before the
Cvuii, ar.kujg ihiis Court to ignore whether their burden was met, and examine a
j v i i i C i i i i i i u c i ct ucvv S i a l i U d r U . H o t i f i c i c g d i S t d u u d i i i S

dppiicdOtc*

' The argument colorably appears to be a "good faith" argument. The Utah
Supicmc Couri has rejected any good faith exception to warrantless searches.
K>

i u t £ V.

O C fl i O SS € V, S U p f u .

The Respondent further argues for a remand for entry of "appropriate"
factual findings, or in the alternative, for additional briefing on the issue by the
parties based upon the record now before the Court. (Petition for Rehearing at
p. 17)- The unvarnished truth of Respondent's petition is that they want the Court
to allow them to cure what they consider to be a deficient record in the lower
court, a record that is not deficient, or is only deficient as a result of the
Respondent's inability to adequately develop the record for its purposes. There
is an abundant and sufficient record of the lower court proceedings. It not only
includes the transcript of the suppression hearing and extensive briefing the re on,
but also includes a deposition and the testimony at the preliminary hearing.
Respondent had more than ample opportunity to develop any theories it wanted
to rely upon to meet its burden. To suggest that this matter should be remanded
so that the Respondent may attempt to have yet another "bite of the apple" is
patently inappropriate and unfair; would be a manifest injustice and undermine the
judicial system developed in this state. The record is presently complete and
fu-viualij establishes what h necessary to support the court's ruling in this case
•

i r

«

Additionally, the argument that supplemental briefing on the issues by the
p u i . UUu U i i ^ t u Uti tiiv- i'CCOi'u u C i O i C i D e i ^ O u f l , S u o t i i u DC r C C | U i i C u , i s iii^O

C u u j c u i VV &;•> uiw1 uTiiy u a f t i a u i i u c i w i u c i i i i i i S ^CdTCTi

wiifiuut

C O u i u HtiVC Occ'fl i i c c l l i c u

ic^,ui.

i k.naiil'y ^ ^ i vtliu ii'i^ Vv ii^ u C iCi llii UCKA 0.101 I H V u t a p O i i U v u i vUiiC'v'UCu i i i ^ n y p c u u n i •*.*
S l a F i U i n g h i tfiiS Car*C

CONCLUSION
The Petition for Rehearing fails to demonstrate any legal basis to warrant
rehearing.

It is apparent the petition is really asking this Court to overrule

controlling case law to allow the Respondent to change the record to its benefit
and the Defendant's detriment.
The Petition for Rehearing should be denied in this matter and the Court
Mioulu affirm its ruling on the issues of standing and consent to search the
^UitCaScS.
^<

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this X ^ _ day of March, 1990

KRISTINE K. SMITH
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